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We evaluate methods for applying unsupervised anomaly detection to cybersecurity applications
on computer network traffic data, or flow. We borrow from the natural language processing literature
and conceptualize flow as a sort of “language” spoken between machines. Five sequence aggregation
rules are evaluated for their efficacy in flagging multiple attack types in a labeled flow dataset,
CICIDS2017. For sequence modeling, we rely on long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural
networks (RNN). Additionally, a simple frequency-based model is described and its performance
with respect to attack detection is compared to the LSTM models. We conclude that the frequency-
based model tends to perform as well as or better than the LSTM models for the tasks at hand,
with a few notable exceptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vulnerabilities lurking undiscovered on computer net-
works threaten to be the vectors of the next major
data breach, service disruption, or illicit appropriation of
hardware. Malicious actors exploit these previously un-
known, little-known, or unpatched vulnerabilities to mis-
use network resources, sometimes to costly or disastrous
effect. When the set of possible vulnerabilities is well-
defined, detection is a matter of maintaining software
that can scan systems and networks for the signatures
of actors exploiting those vulnerabilities. However, so-
phisticated actors will sometimes rely on novel, or 0day,
vulnerabilities that are typically resistant to signature-
based detection. Unsupervised learning, a subset of ma-
chine learning that relies on data without annotations
or labels, is well-suited for the task of detecting the ex-
ploitation of obscure or unknown vulnerabilities.
Cybersecurity encompasses a broad set of challenges in-
cluding, but not limited to, intrusion detection, incident
response, malware analysis, and attribution. Here we
focus on the detection of malicious network activities,
broadly defined. Historically, intrusion detection soft-
ware, antivirus software, and similar tools have relied on
heuristic-based rules and malware signatures to perform
detection. Matching techniques like these are effective
when similar attacks are known to security software de-
velopers a priori. Detecting malicious events on a net-
work that are previously unknown or for which detection
rules do not yet exist requires a different approach. Here,
we demonstrate the use of unsupervised machine learn-
ing to identify anomalies on a network by modeling the
network’s “normal” behavior and scoring deviations from
this baseline.
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We proceed by first providing a very brief background
of machine learning for cybersecurity applications.1 We
then discuss CICIDS2017, a publicly available dataset
for cybersecurity and intrusion detection research. Close
attention is paid to data processing and feature genera-
tion. The methodology section introduces the models to
be used and evaluation criteria. We present the results
of our analysis and conclude with a short discussion of
open questions and directions for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
Machine learning for cybersecurity is a growing area of
research. Researchers from Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory and Western Washington University have
used recurrent neural networks (RNN) to analyze authen-
tication log data [2–4]. These works not only demon-
strate the capacity for anomaly detection via RNNs in
system log data but also introduce an attention mecha-
nism to the model that provides context for the flagged
anomalies. These works follow earlier an application of
long short-term memory (LSTM) models for intrusion de-
tection given system call logs captured at the host level
[5]. Machine learning has also found its way into both
commercial and open source security software solutions.
Mirsky et al. introduce Kitsune, a network intrusion de-
tection system (NIDS) based on an ensemble of artificial
neural network (ANN) autoencoders [6]. Autoencoders
are models that learn an identify function to map data
points to themselves often via an intermediate step that
compresses the data before it is reconstructed. Kitsune
is open source software and is available online [7].
Recent work has demonstrated that Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) can
be applied to the problem of anomaly detection in com-
puter network flow data [8]. We follow this previous work
1 For a more thorough review on this topic, readers may be inter-
ested in [1].
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TABLE I: Attack Types in CICIDS2017
Attack Flow Count Proportion
Benign 2358036 8.3e-1
DoS Hulk 231073 8.2e-2
Port Scan 158930 5.6e-2
DDoS 41835 1.5e-2
DoS GoldenEye 10293 3.6e-3
FTPPatator 7938 2.8e-3
SSHPatator 5897 2.1e-3
DoS Slow Loris 5796 2.0e-3
DoS Slow HTTP Test 5499 1.9e-3
Botnet 1966 7.0e-4
Web Attack: Brute Force 1507 5.3e-4
Web Attack: XSS 652 2.3e-4
Infiltration 36 1.3e-5
Web Attack: SQL Injection 21 7.0e-6
Heartbleed 11 4.0e-6
here and evaluate four new aggregation rules, in addition
to the previously introduced IP-dyad-hour, as well as a
simpler model for anomaly detection.
III. DATA
We rely on a public dataset for intrusion detection (IDS)
tasks from the University of New Brunswick’s (UNB)
Canadian Institute for Cyberseurity (CIC) [9]. The
dataset, CICIDS2017, comprises 3.1 million flow records
[10]. This dataset covers five days in 2017 and includes
labeled attack types shown in Table I. The documenta-
tion that accompanies CICIDS2017 lists additional at-
tack types that are not present in the flow data. We be-
lieve these to be undifferentiated subcategories of those
attacks listed here.2 Benign traffic was artificially gener-
ated to simulate user behaviors while attacks were per-
formed manually. After dropping incomplete records, ap-
proximately 2.9 million flows remain. UNB CIC also pro-
vides full packet capture for CICIDS2017 though those
data are not utilized for this work.
Atheoretical detection of malicious actions or events in
cybersecurity-relevant data is difficult to validate due to
the observed heterogeneity in attack style and the inge-
nuity of malicious actors. CICIDS2017 provides us the
opportunity only to demonstrate that anomaly detection
techniques can or cannot identify events of the specific
types and characteristics as those present in the data.
Caution should therefore be taken when extrapolating
2 These include Infiltration – Dropbox download and Infiltration –
Cool disk – MAC among others.
the results presented here to unsupervised anomaly de-
tection in computer network data more generally. Theo-
rizing about a network’s vulnerabilities and potential ad-
versaries (i.e. having a threat model) will likely produce
better results than fully unsupervised machine learning
techniques.3
In keeping with the this paper’s goal of a generalizable
anomaly detection approach to cybersecurity, the models
presented herein are entirely unsupervised. The “ground
truth” labels provided by CIC are used only for post-
facto evaluation and are ignored prior (including during
model selection, tuning, and training). However, we rec-
ognize that “unsupervised” is something of a misnomer.
While no information whatsoever about the attack types
is used in model training, the modeling process starts
long before the training phase. Feature selection, unit
aggregation, and other data pre-processing steps neces-
sarily influence what characteristics of network traffic are
learned and what characteristics are not. To the extent
that attacks are anomalous with respect to only certain
features or levels of aggregation, the data pre-processing
phase encodes a prior estimate of those features that will
best reveal malicious activities. Attacks vary in purpose
and implementation and therefore resist a singular fea-
ture set for identification. Attacks that manifest in un-
usual byte count patterns may not manifest in unusual
port sequences and vice versa.
Incomplete records with respect to required fields are
dropped from the data.4 We also omit all 1253 records
that do not include at least one internal IP address. In-
ternal IP addresses are listed in the CICIDS2017 docu-
mentation.
A. Feature Set
We evaluate two feature sets. The feature sets are
taken directly from [8]. We adopt these features for sev-
eral reasons including demonstrated past performance,
their applicability to many flavors of network flow data,
and to avoid feature over-engineering. Complex fea-
ture engineering could run afoul of our goal to eschew
heuristic-based attack detection.5 We refer to the two
feature sets as protobytes and ports. Protobyte se-
quences are generated by concatenating a time-ordered
3 Grok your data generating processes.
4 The authors recognize that multiple imputation may be the pre-
ferred method for addressing incomplete records in some fields
but opt for row-wise deletion in keeping with how we anticipate
a deployed cybersecurity solution would behave.
5 If a network owner understands the specifics of their threat
model, more nuanced feature engineering is likely to result in
better performance.
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series of protobyte tokens; a protobyte token is de-
fined as protocol:blog2(bytes)c. An example proto-
byte sequence would look like: TCP:10|TCP:12|UDP:04.
The second feature set, port sequences, is generated by
first determining the likely service port for each record
in the flow data. Flow data contain two ports per
record, one per device. Of those, one port is typically
a “service port,” a port reserved for a known appli-
cation or service. For simplicity, we rely on heuristic
rules to select the likely service port for each record.
In particular, we set service port to be the result of
min(min(src port, 10000),min(dst port, 10000)). An
example port sequence would look like 80|443|80.
B. Aggregation Rules
For both feature sets, we evaluate five sequence aggre-
gation rules. We refer to these by their units of analy-
sis: source, destination, dyad, internal, and external. For
each aggregation rule, we first order the data by time
and then group by the unit of analysis per hour. Source
and destination aggregation concatenate tokens in time-
order after grouping by (source IP, date, hour) and
(destination IP, date, hour), respectively. A dyad-
hour is defined as the tuple (source IP, destination
IP, date, hour). Finally, internal and external are de-
fined by the tuples (internal IP, date, hour) and
(external IP, date, hour), respectively. Each aggre-
gation rule results in a unique set of sequences – se-
quences are only guaranteed to be contiguous with re-
spect to the chosen aggregation rule.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our approach diverges from [8] in our method of out-
lier, or anomaly, scoring. Previous works assigned an
attack/benign label to every dyad-hour unit. Each dyad-
hour unit’s anomaly score was essentially the minimum
predicted probability for any token in the given dyad-
hour. In the current paper, we score every individual se-
quence token conditional on the learned model and on the
10 tokens that immediately precede the predicted token.
A target token’s outlier score is the predicted probabil-
ity of the correct token given the model parameters and
previously-observed tokens within the same sequence. A
token here is defined as a single element of a sequence;
tokens correspond to individual rows of flow data.
A. Sequence Modeling
For sequence modeling, we follow previous work [8]. Se-
quences of length 10 are produced for each dyad via a
Embedding 
[50 x 10] 
Bidirectional LSTM 
[50 x 10] Linear 
Dropout 
(20%) 
Bidirectional LSTM 
[50 x 1] ReLU 
Dropout 
(20%) 
Dense 
[100 x 1] Linear 
Dropout 
(20%) 
Dense 
[# unique tokens x 1] Softmax 
FIG. 1: LSTM Architecture. Layer output dimensions
indicated by [m× n].
rolling window. Sequences are left-padded with zero-
values that are masked during training. For each length
10 sequence, the value of the subsequent (11th) token,
the target, is predicted.
We train all models on the first day of data, July 3,
2017. A 10-token sliding window is utilized to gener-
ate sequences. All sequences are left zero-padded and the
sliding window is moved one token at a time. Because the
first day contains no attack data, this training method
corresponds to the clean baseline method described in
[8]. That previous work demonstrated that it is not nec-
essary to train models on clean network traffic data to
perform successful anomaly detection. We elect to train
on the first day of data both for simplicity and with the
understanding that future applications of this work will
likely require that models be trained in advance of de-
ployment rather than on an ongoing basis. The train-
ing sets comprise approximately 450,000 sequences (with
50,000 reserved for validation) with slight variations de-
pending on aggregation rule.
B. Long Short-Term Memory Model
Long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural net-
works (RNN) are utilized here. The chosen model archi-
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tecture is summarized in Figure 1. We begin with an em-
bedding layer that projects the sequence token values into
a dense 50-dimensional vector. The embedded sequences
are then passed through two bidirectional LSTM layers.
Bidirectional LSTMs read the input sequence both for-
wards and backwards and then concatenate the output
vectors. The second LSTM layer introduces non-linearity
via the use of rectified linear unit activation. The output
of the second LSTM is passed to a fully-connected dense
layer and finally to an output fully-connected dense layer
with softmax activation. Because the target is multiclass,
models are trained to minimize multiclass cross-entropy.
We optimize via TensorFlow’s Lazy Adam optimizer; due
to the sparsity of input vectors, we do not need to up-
date all weights at every step, only those that are active
on the forward pass.6 Class weights are provided during
training due to class imbalance.
C. Evaluation
After a model is trained, it is used to predict the out-of-
sample tokens for the remaining sequences (July 4 – July
7). For the protobytes sequences, all out-of-sample to-
kens are predicted and assigned an outlier score. For the
port sequences, the sliding window is shifted by 3 tokens
at every step. Therefore, only one-third of all out-of-
sample port sequence tokens is assigned an outlier score.
This is done to alleviate memory constraints encountered
when operating on the full set of port sequence tokens.
The remaining two-thirds of out-of-sample port sequence
tokens are omitted. Outlier scores are the negative of the
predicted probability assigned to the correct value of the
target token.
Every model is run three times. For each replication of a
model, the training data are resampled with replacement.
We then average over the results of each set of models to
produce a bootstrapped estimate of the mean area under
(AUC) the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC).
A grand total of 30 models are trained: 2 feature sets ×
5 aggregation rules × 3 resampled training sets.
D. Baseline Comparison
In addition to LSTM models, we also evaluate a sim-
ple frequency-based method of outlier detection. For
both sets of tokens, protobytes and ports, the train-
ing set frequencies of those tokens are calculated. Out-
lier scores are assigned to test set tokens according to
6 https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/contrib/
opt/LazyAdamOptimizer
score(tokenj) = − 1n
∑n
i=1 Ii=tokenj , where n is the num-
ber of examples in the training set and Ii=tokenj is an
indicator that takes a value 1 if i = tokenj and 0 other-
wise.
V. RESULTS
Tables II and III report the average AUC value for ev-
ery protobyte and port sequence model, respectively. For
every attack type, the best AUC score is shown in bold.
The ROC plots themselves are included in the Appendix,
Tables IV – IX. The average curve is bold and the three
bootstrap curves are thin and dashed. All four curves are
presented to provide the reader with a visual representa-
tion of the variance in model performance with respect
to repeated sampling.7
We measure the effectiveness of a model with AUC. The
AUC can be interpreted as the probability that a model
assigns a higher anomaly score to an attack token than
to a randomly chosen non-attack token. An AUC of 1
corresponds to perfect separation of attacks from non-
attacks while an AUC of 0.5 indicates that a model is
working no better than chance. Negative AUC values in-
dicate that the model is performing worse than chance; a
possibility in situations where attack labels are unavail-
able (i.e. for unsupervised tasks) and therefore modelers
are unable to determine whether outlier scores should be
inverted.8 “All Attacks” indicates that all attack types
have been collapsed to a single category. For all other
individual attack types, the attack type of interest is la-
beled “attack” and all other attack types are combined
with benign data to form the “non-attack” category.
Overall, there is a substantial amount of variation in at-
tack detection performance across aggregation rules and
attack types. The simple frequency-based models tend to
outperform the LSTM models. In all but two cases, the
frequency-based model performs at least comparably to,
if not better than, the best of the corresponding LSTM
models. The exceptions are in the LSTMs’ ability to
detect SQL injection attacks and infiltration. Given pro-
tobyte sequences, the LSTMs outperform the frequency
model for both attack types across all aggregation rules.
7 In Table IV the three columns correspond to performance in the
protobyte-based frequency model, the port sequence model, and
a combination of the two called PC1. PC1 is the projection of
frequency-based protobyte anomaly scores and frequency-based
port anomaly scores onto their first principal component. This
column is included for interested readers but is not discussed
further.
8 Note that the computation of AUC requires labeled data points
and is therefore typically found in the context of supervised mod-
eling. Here, we are using fully unsupervised models but have the
benefit of a labeled data set with which to evaluate performance
post facto.
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TABLE II: Protobyte Sequence AUC
LSTM Frequency
Source Destination Dyad Internal External
All Attacks 0.44 0.27 0.24 0.37 0.46 0.80
Botnet 0.47 0.35 0.30 0.61 0.54 0.57
DoS GoldenEye 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.65
DoS Hulk 0.50 0.25 0.24 0.46 0.34 0.66
DoS Slow HTTP Test 0.32 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.59
DoS Slow Loris 0.52 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.52 0.53
FTPPatator 0.46 0.62 0.73 0.47 0.69 0.64
Heartbleed 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Infiltration 0.93 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.82 0.73
Port Scan 0.32 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.63 0.96
SSHPatator 0.48 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.51
Web Attack Brute Force 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.20 0.34 0.51
Web Attack SQL Injection 0.66 0.81 0.72 0.57 0.68 0.56
Web Attack XSS 0.08 0.31 0.10 0.09 0.24 0.48
Highest AUC per row in bold.
TABLE III: Port Sequence AUC
LSTM Frequency
Source Destination Dyad Internal External
All Attacks 0.49 0.68 0.70 0.55 0.71 0.87
Botnet 0.88 0.90 0.82 0.91 0.86 0.93
DoS GoldenEye 0.22 0.47 0.48 0.32 0.51 0.71
DoS Hulk 0.17 0.46 0.48 0.29 0.51 0.74
DoS Slow HTTP Test 0.25 0.50 0.48 0.34 0.52 0.71
DoS Slow Loris 0.24 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.52 0.71
FTPPatator 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.79 0.88 0.91
Heartbleed 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.98 0.96
Infiltration 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.96
Port Scan 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98
SSHPatator 0.69 0.80 0.84 0.65 0.84 0.87
Web Attack Brute Force 0.21 0.60 0.48 0.32 0.54 0.71
Web Attack SQL Injection 0.21 0.81 0.48 0.31 0.63 0.71
Web Attack XSS 0.21 0.65 0.48 0.31 0.56 0.71
Highest AUC per row in bold.
All aggregation rules and both feature sets are able to
flag the use of Heartbleed; AUC scores for detection of
this particular attack fall between 0.95 and 1.0. Unsur-
prisingly, port scans are faithfully detected under all ag-
gregation rules when analyzing port sequences and are
not detected when analyzing protobyte sequences. Cu-
riously, while the protobyte LSTMs are unable to catch
the port scan, the frequency-based model detects it with
an AUC of 0.96. Future work should examine what pro-
tobyte tokens are flagged by the frequency-based model
with respect to the port scan and determine why the
LSTM models assign these tokens relatively high pre-
dicted probabilities.
The port frequency-based model scores an AUC of 0.71
or above for all attack types and averages 0.87. The
highest average AUC achieved by an LSTM model is 0.71,
the score for port sequences aggregated by external IP
address. The average AUC may not be the best metric for
practical applications as there should be no expectation
that any single feature set or any single aggregation rule
should produce the best attack detector for all attacks.
Instead, clever methods for ensemble anomaly detection
are needed to leverage the relative strengths of a variety
of models and feature sets.
VI. CONCLUSION
That the chosen aggregation rule makes, on the whole,
minimal difference in attack detection is intriguing. Per-
haps event sequences are less important in detecting the
given attacks than is the relative frequency of the tar-
get token itself. In other words, perhaps aggregation
rules are entirely unnecessary and a probability model
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based on token frequency would perform equally well.
This would seem an unsatisfactory cybersecurity solu-
tion, however, for all but the most homogeneous of net-
works with respect to flow generation.
Alternatively, perhaps the LSTM models are best-suited
for capturing attack onsets rather than all flows associ-
ated with attacks. Once an attack has begun, perhaps
the transitions between attack tokens are easily modeled
by the LSTM. This could be the case, for instance, if the
model learns a simple autoregressive process in which
high probability is assigned to the most recently seen
value in the sequence. The first token of an attack se-
quence may then appear anomalous but subsequent to-
kens would appear normal, given that the model has al-
ready seen previous attack tokens. In future work, we
intend to examine this possibility by repeating our anal-
yses but re-coding attack tokens that are immediately
preceded (within a sequence) by a same-valued attack
token.
Another possibility is that sequences of flow-like data
simple do not encode much information. Flow is al-
ready an aggregation of underlying time-ordered data.
One flow can represent dozens or hundreds of packets,
each with their own unique attributes. By aggregating
to the flow level, the variability of data within that flow
is lost and only summary statistics remain. In a natu-
ral language analogy, this would be like taken a series of
sentences and replacing them with metadata entries that
encode the number of words and characters per sentence.
The language-like structure of communication between
machines (proxied by IP address) has been lost in favor
of a summary that omits all of the content and much of
the context of what is said.
Future research should apply sequence modeling and
deep learning techniques directly to the packet-level data.
It is possible that, in doing so, flow aggregation is made
unnecessary and that determinations about data reten-
tion and importance could be made at the packet level or
lower. This may come with high computation and stor-
age costs and so researchers should take care to balance
their solutions against real-world constraints that may
not be apparent in lab settings.
While the results presented above may not initially ap-
pear encouraging with respect to the applicability of cer-
tain deep learning techniques to flow-like network data,
we caution against undo pessimism. We make no claim
to have identified the ideal, or even good, feature sets, ag-
gregation rules, model architectures, or hyperparameter
settings. Furthermore, CICIDS2017 is built on largely
simulated traffic and so the generalizability of results on
these data is open for debate, especially with respect to
networks that do not resemble the simulated network in
terms of size, roles, hardware, software, and threat mod-
els. Instead, we present these results in the hope that
they encourage further research into machine learning
approaches to cybersecurity and as a reminder that com-
plex models are not always the best models.
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TABLE IV: Frequency Model A
Protobyte Sequences Port Sequences PC1
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.80
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.87
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.89
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.57
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.93
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.91
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.65
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.72
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.66
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.74
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.75
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.59
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.70
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.53
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.66
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.64
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.91
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.90
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TABLE V: Frequency Model B
Protobyte Sequences Port Sequences PC1
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 1.00
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.96
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 1.00
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.73
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.96
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.93
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.96
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.99
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.51
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.87
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.90
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.51
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.66
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.56
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.67
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.65
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TABLE VI: Protobyte Sequences A
Source Destination Dyad Internal External
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.44
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.27
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.24
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.37
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.46
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.47
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.35
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.30
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.61
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.54
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.63
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.63
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.64
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.61
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.58
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.50
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.25
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.24
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.46
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.34
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.32
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.40
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.39
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.34
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.38
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.52
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.61
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.62
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.47
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.52
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.46
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.62
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.73
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.47
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.69
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TABLE VII: Protobyte Sequences B
Source Destination Dyad Internal External
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 1.00
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.99
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.99
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 1.00
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 1.00
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.93
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.86
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.86
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.91
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.82
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.32
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.29
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.23
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.25
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.63
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.60
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.57
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.51
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.47
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.18
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.36
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.25
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.20
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.34
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.66
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.81
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.72
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.57
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.68
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.08
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.31
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.10
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.09
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.24
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TABLE VIII: Service Port Sequences A
Source Destination Dyad Internal External
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.49
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.68
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.70
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.55
FPR
TP
R
All Attacks
AUC = 0.71
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.88
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.90
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.82
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.91
FPR
TP
R
Botnet
AUC = 0.86
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.22
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.47
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.32
FPR
TP
R
DoS GoldenEye
AUC = 0.51
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.17
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.46
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.29
FPR
TP
R
DoS Hulk
AUC = 0.51
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.25
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.50
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.34
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow HTTP Test
AUC = 0.52
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.24
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.51
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.34
FPR
TP
R
DoS Slow Loris
AUC = 0.52
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.82
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.85
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.89
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.79
FPR
TP
R
FTPPatator
AUC = 0.88
12
A APPENDIX
TABLE IX: Service Port Sequences B
Source Destination Dyad Internal External
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.96
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 1.00
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.99
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.95
FPR
TP
R
Heartbleed
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.95
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.95
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
Infiltration
AUC = 0.95
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.97
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.97
FPR
TP
R
Port Scan
AUC = 0.98
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.69
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.80
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.84
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.65
FPR
TP
R
SSHPatator
AUC = 0.84
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.21
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.60
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.32
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack Brute Force
AUC = 0.54
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.21
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.81
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.31
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack SQL Injection
AUC = 0.63
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.21
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.65
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.48
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.31
FPR
TP
R
Web Attack XSS
AUC = 0.56
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